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Criminal Law
Dale E. Bennett*
Entrapment
The line between improper entrapment which constitutes a
defense to crime, and proper police activity in laying traps for
would-be criminals, is largely drawn with reference to the origin
of the criminal plan. Was the defendant lured into crime by
conviction-prone police, or did the police merely furnish an os-
tensible opportunity for crime to a defendant who had already
planned such a venture? In State v. Turner' the defendants were
"ready and willing," having solicited a correctional officer to
assist them in smuggling contraband articles into the State
Penitentiary. The plan was reported by the officer to his supe-
riors, who instructed him to cooperate with the defendants'
scheme in order to obtain evidence of the smuggling operation.
In holding that the officer's cooperation did not constitute im-
proper entrapment, the Supreme Court stressed the facts that
"the crime was conceived in the minds of the defendants; it was
there that the criminal intent was born. The defendants were
not incited or induced to commit the offense by the Correctional
Officer or any other official."'2 Justice Sanders stressed the
"limited application" of the entrapment concept, and declared,
"It is restricted to those instances in which a defendant is in-
duced or incited to commit a crime not originally intended or
contemplated by him, for the purpose of arresting him... There
is a clear distinction between inducing a person to commit a
crime and setting a trap to catch him in the execution of crim-
inal designs of his own conception... the primary emphasis is
on the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime."'3
28. 227 La. 347, 79 So.2d 333 (1955). This case has now been overruled legis-
latively by LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1871 (1960). However, the appel-
late courts were powerless to apply the new code rule, since the case had been
decided by the trial court prior to the effective date of the new procedural code.
See LA. Acts 1960, No. 15, § 4(B) (2) (b).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 241 La. 94, 127 So.2d 512 (1961).
2. 127 So.2d at 515.
3. 127 So.2d at 514. For another excellent statement of the law of entrapment,
see Butler v. United States, 191 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1951).
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Criminal Statutes - "Intentional" Means General Criminal
Intent
Constitutionality of the much-challenged and frequently
amended obscenity article of the Criminal Code 4 was considered
in State v. Roufa.5 The trial court had sustained a motion to
quash on the ground that the obscenity article, upon which the
information was based, "lacked the necessary requirement of
scienter." In reversing the trial court's ruling, the Supreme
Court held that the word "intentional" in the obscenity article
fully met the scienter requirement. In this regard it is signifi-
cant that Article 11 of the Criminal Code expressly provides that
in the definitions of crimes "in the absence of qualifying pro-
visions, the terms 'intent' and 'intentional' have reference to
'general criminal intent.'" In view of this code statement, it
would appear amply clear that when Article 106 recites that
"Obscenity is the intentional: Production, sale, exhibition" etc.,
it is necessary that the prescribed criminal acts be accompanied
by a general criminal intent. After a thorough survey of rel-
evant federal and Louisiana jurisprudence, Justice Hamlin
further apporpriately concludes "that the word 'intentional' and
the phrase 'with intention' in the Louisiana Obscenity Statute
mean that knowledge is implied where one has criminal intent.
It leaps to the mind that knowledge is necessary to intention and
that one cannot have intention without knowledge."6 Under this
normal and logical interpretation of Article 106, the innocent
and unknowing possessor of obscene matter will not be subject
to criminal prosecution.
The Supreme Court similarly held, in State v. Kelly,7 that
criminal intent is an essential element of the offense of mal-
feasance in office, which is defined by Article 134 of the Crimi-
nal Code as the "intentional" performance or non-performance
of certain specified acts.
Sufficiency of Statutory Definition
Jury tampering is defined in Article 129 of the Criminal
Code as "any influencing of, or attempt to influence, any petit
4. LA. R.S. 14:106 (1950), as amended by Act 388 of 1958. This provision
was again amended by Act 199 of 1960, but retaining the language challenged in
Roufa.
5. 241 La. 474, 129 So.2d 743 (1961).
6. 129 So.2d at 747.
7. State v. Kelley, 241 La. 224, 128 So.2d 18 (1961).
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juror in respect to his verdict in any cause pending, or about to
be brought before him, otherwise than in the regular course of
proceedings upon the trial of such cause." (Emphasis added.) In
State v. Robertson8 the Louisiana Supreme Court, by a 4 to 3
decision, held the jury tampering law unconstitutional. The ma-
jority opinion was predicated on the notion that the word "in-
fluence" failed to draw a sufficiently clear line between lawful
and criminal conduct. In so holding the Supreme Court made a
number of general statements which are eminently correct and
well supported by precedent. Justice Sanders stated, "It is well
established that the constitutional requirement of definiteness is
violated by a criminal statute which fails to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his conduct is criminal.
... Under this test a statute is valid in the absence of a detailed
specification if the general phraseology used in defining the
crime has a fixed, definite, or commonly understood meaning and
application.... However, if the definition of the crime is couched
only in general language which is ambiguous, vague, or indefi-
nite to such an extent that the line between criminal and non-
criminal conduct is obscure, the statute is repugnant to the state
constitution."9
This writer is in complete agreement with the above state-
ments in Justice Sanders' scholarly opinion, but not with the
conclusion that in the jury tampering provision "the key word
[influence] stands stark and bare."'10 Instead it is clearly lim-
ited by the article in which it is employed to influencing a petit
juror "in respect to his verdict." As Justice Hamlin points out
in his dissenting opinion, "it leaps to the mind" that the pro-
hibited influence refers solely to the verdicts which the jurors
may render at the trial. Proper court activity of attorneys and
witnesses is expressly excluded from the offense by the conclud-
ing requirement that the influencing must be "otherwise than
in the regular cause of proceedings upon the trial of the case."
All other influencing or efforts to influence jurors constitutes
jury tampering. It should be no objection to the Jury Tampering
Article that it covers conduct with jurors that would otherwise
come within the general offenses of Public Bribery" or Public
Intimidation. 2 There are a number of situations where criminal
8. 241 La. 249, 128 So.2d 646 (1961).
9. 128 So.2d at 647, 648.
10. 128 So.2d at 649.
11. LA. R.S. 14:118 (1950).
12. Id. 14:122.
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conduct may be punished under more than one code article. For
example, Issuing Worthless Checks 3 could also be prosecuted as
Theft ;14 and many Attempted Murder 5 cases could also be pros-
ecuted as Aggravated Battery or Aggravated Assault.1 6 Article
4 of the Criminal Code recognizes these situations and provides
that "prosecution may proceed under either provision, in the dis-
cretion of the district attorney.' 1 7 The majority opinion ex-
presses a fear that "A newspaper article, a bribe, a gesture, a
smile, a lifting of the eyebrows - all can be caught in its broad
net."'18 It is inconceivable that any court would so hold in view
of the universally recognized principle that a criminal statute is
to be strictly construed in favor of the accused.
A more liberal attitude was evidenced in State v. Hertzog.1
In Hertzog the Supreme Court upheld the anonymous phone call
statute which makes it a crime to engage in an anonymous tele-
phone call wherein "obscene, profane, vulgar, lewd, lascivious or
indecent language" is used.20 Defense counsel had urged that the
term "vulgar," being a word of varied meanings and many gra-
dations, lacked the certainty and definiteness which the Consti-
tution requires. While arguing that the phrase "vulgar lan-
guage," if standing alone would be subject to challenge, the Su-
preme Court pointed out that the word took added and more
definite meaning from other qualifying language in the statute,
i.e., that the entire series, "obscene, profane, vulgar, lewd, las-
civious or indecent language," has a clearly understandable
meaning. In so holding, Justice Hamiter aptly concludes, "in the
statute involved here the word 'vulgar' is accompanied by sev-
eral specific adjectives which may and should be considered,
under the rule noscitur a socus, as imparting to it a restricted
and definite meaning .... Under this rule general and specific
words, capable of analogous meaning, when associated together,
take color from each other, so that general words are restricted
to a sense analogous to less general." 2' The rule that the word
"vulgar" in the statute takes color and meaning from the words
with which it is associated does not carry over to the use of that
13. LA. R.S. 14:71 (Supp. 1956).
14. LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950).
15. Id. 14:27 and 30.
16. Id. 14:34 or 37.
17. Id. 14:4.
18. 128 So.2d at 649.
19. 241 La. 783, 131 So.2d 788 (1961).
20. LA. R.S. 14:285 (1958).
21. 131 So.2d at 789.
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word, without further qualification or associated terms, in an
indictment charging the offense. Thus, the information in Hert-
zog, which charged only that the defendant used "vulgar lan-
guage" in the alleged anonymous telephone call was quashed for
insufficiency.
Contributing to the Delinquency of Juveniles
The principal question in State v. Gonzales22 was whether the
phrase "child under the age of seventeen" in Article 92 of the
Criminal Code, which defines the offense of contributing to the
delinquency of juveniles, includes persons under the age of seven-
teen who have been emancipated by marriage. In holding that
the emancipated juvenile was not a "child" within the meaning
of Article 92, the Supreme Court held that the term must be
construed in conformity with its generally accepted legal mean-
ing as of the time when the Criminal Code was adopted. "It is
to be presumed," states Justice McCaleb, "that the Legislature
used the word 'child' in its ordinary accepted meaning under the
civil law, that is, a juvenile subject to parental control or guard-
ianship and that it does not include a minor emancipated by mar-
riage. Had it been its design to extend the law to all minors
under the age of seventeen, irrespective of their legal status, the
lawmaker would have used the word 'person' or 'anyone' under
seventeen instead of 'child.' "2 Justice Hawthorne, in a dissent-
ing opinion, disagrees with the propriety of resorting to Civil
Code analogies to limit the word "child" to juveniles who are
unemancipated by marriage. Justice Hawthorne would follow
the ordinary meaning of the word "child," and aptly concludes,
"Had the legislature intended the statute not to apply to a mar-
ried person, it could have made its language read 'any unmarried
child under the age of seventeen,' as was done in the carnal
knowledge statute, R.S. 14:80, in which the language 'unmarried
female' is used."'24 A strong argument, stated by the majority
opinion, wherein the term "child" is construed with its Civil
Code limitations, is the fact that a change in the Orleans Parish
Juvenile Court statute was made in order that emancipated juve-
niles would be subject to juvenile court jurisdiction; whereas, no
such change was made in the Criminal Code article defining the
offense of contributing to the delinquency of juveniles. 25
22. 241 La. 619, 129 So.2d 796 (1961).
23. 129 So.2d at 798.
24. Id. at 800.
25. Id. at 799.
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Change of Venue
The change of venue articles of the Louisiana Code of Crim-
inal Procedure' are based on the idea that a defendant should
not be tried in a parish where there is such prejudice that a fair
trial cannot be had. Extreme public prejudice will affect jurors
and witnesses, and may even affect the presiding judge. In
State v. Wilson,2 an aggravated rape case, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the well-settled rules that the burden of proof of
establishing "that a defendant could not secure a fair and im-
partial trial in the parish where the indictment is laid rests with
the applicant"; and that applications for a change of venue are
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose ruling
will not be interfered with unless an abuse of such discretion is
shown.3 In Wilson the defense had presented only one witness,
and his testimony was not very strong. This proof fell far short
of showing that a fair trial could not be had, and the trial judge
had properly refused a change of venue. Even in a close case
the trial judge's determination is invariably affirmed by the
Supreme Court, for he is in the best position to size up the local
situation.4
It is worthy of note that the Wilson opinion reiterates a well-
settled Louisiana change of venue rule that the test to be applied
is whether a fair and impartial jury can be obtained." This test,
looking only to whether an impartial jury can be secured, places
a distinct and unfortunate limitation on the grounds which may
be urged for a change of venue. It fails to take into considera-
tion the fact that a fair trial may also be precluded by general
public resentment and hostility which will so affect witnesses
that they will not testify freely and frankly. The language of
Article 292 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is broadly stated
and should encompass all effects of the tensions caused by great
1. LA. R.S. 15:289-301 (1950). LA. CONST. art. I, § 19, recognizes the power
of the legislature to provide for change of venue.
2. 240 La. 1087, 127 So.2d 158 (1961).
3. Id. at 1103, 127 So.2d at 164.
4. 18 Fed. Bar Assn. 56 (1958).
5. Ibid. Following the leading case in point of State v. Scott, 237 La. 71, 110
So.2d 530 (1959), and others.
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public hostility -whether they be upon prospective jurors, the
jury finally selected or upon witnesses.
Indictments Based on Illegal Evidence
The Louisiana Supreme Court has upheld a trial judge's re-
fusal of a bill of particulars which sought information as to the
nature of the evidence that had been presented to the grand jury
which indicted the defendant6 In general, the so-called "veil of
secrecy" as to the evidence considered by the grand jury will not
be lifted to permit a review of the evidence upon which the in-
dictment is based; and this despite the fact that Article 213 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly declares that "In the in-
vestigation of a crime the grand jury can receive no other than
legal evidence." However, relief will be granted where, under
clearly established facts, the indictment is founded on other than
legal evidence. In State v. Jamison7 the court held that an indict-
ment was "an absolute nullity" when founded in part on testi-
mony of the defendant when he was ordered before the grand
jury and interrogated without being fully advised of his privi-
lege against self-incrimination.
Privileged Testimony Before Grand Jury
In order to facilitate proof of the crime by co-conspirators in
bribery cases, Article 19, Section 13, of the Louisiana Constitu-
tion provides that a person called to testify in a bribery investi-
gation is denied the general privilege against self-incrimination,
"but such testimony shall not afterwards be used against him in
any judicial proceedings, except for perjury in giving such testi-
mony." In State v. Smalling8 this provision was invoked by a
defendant who had been called before a grand jury which was
investigating public bribery in which he was involved. Later the
district attorney filed informations, based on the defendant's
testimony before the grand jury, charging him with public
bribery. These informations were quashed, upon the ground that
the testimony secured in the grand jury proceeding could not be
used "in the filing and prosecution of charges against him [the
defendant]." Thus it is clearly established that the constitution-
al immunity of Article 19, Section 13, is not limited to cases
where the person testifying appeared as a witness against some-
6. State v. Simpson, 216 La. 212, 43 So.2d 585 (1949).
7. 240 La. 787, 125 So.2d 363 (1960).
8. 240 La. 915, 125 So.2d 409 (1960).
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one else. It also applies where he is summoned before the grand
jury to testify "when he is the one being investigated for
bribery."9
Amendment of Indictment
Under the express language of Article 253 of the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial court is given plenary
authority to amend an indictment "in respect to any defect, im-
perfection or omission in form or substance." In State v. Wil-
son"' the trial court permitted the state to amend an aggravated
rape indictment by inserting the date of the alleged crime, which
had been inadvertently omitted. The amendment was to cure a
formal defect, since the time and date are not of the essence in
the crime of rape." Rape may be committed on any day of the
week or at any time of the day; and, being a capital crime, is not
subject to time limitations. 2 The amendment was timely, since
it was made before arraignment and trial.13 Also, the defendant
had suffered no prejudice by the amendment, since there was no
claim that his defense was an alibi. If the defendant had been
relying on an alibi and was taken by surprise by the date stated
in the amended indictment, he would have been entitled to a con-
tinuance to enable him to prepare to account for his presence on
the date stated.
14
Short-Form Indictments Upheld
The short form indictment, authorized by Article 235 of the
1928 Code of Criminal Procedure, provides effective relief from
the technicalities of the old common law rules. The basic func-
tion of the indictment is to inform the accused of the crime
charged, reserving a recital of the details of the offense for the
bill of particulars which is not subject to the same rules of strict
9. Id. at 922, 125 So.2d at 411.
10. 240 La. 1087, 127 So.2d 158 (1961).
11. Under LA. R.S. 15:234 (1950) an indictment is not insufficient "for omit-
ting to state the time at which an offense is committed where time is not of the
essence of the offense."
12. 240 La. 1087, 1095, 127 So.2d 158, 161, citing LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950). Capital
offenses are similarly excluded from time limitations under the 1960 Time Limita-
tions law - on the theory that the book never closes on a capital crime. (See
R.S. 15:7.1).
13. State v. Johnson, 181 La. 1, 158 So. 570 (1935).
14. LA. R.S. 15:253 (1950), applied in State v. Singleton, 169 La. 191, 124
So. 824 (1929). Cf. State v. Jones, 195 La. 611, 197 So. 249 (1940) where the
date of the offense was not material and a continuance was properly refused.
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construction as the indictment. This precludes the use of the
indictment as a vehicle for a battle of wits between the district
attorney and defense counsel who seek to checkmate the state by
reason of some inadvertent and often highly technical omission.
The specific short forms of Article 235 have been consistently
upheld.15 A 1944 amendment of Article 235 extended the short
forms to all Criminal Code crimes, providing that it would "be
sufficient to charge the defendant by using the name and article
number of the offense committed."' 16 In State v. Straughan17 an
indictment drawn pursuant to the 1944 amendment sought to
charge the multifarious and purely statutory crime of gambling
by name and article number. The Straughan gambling indict-
ment was held insufficient, but Justice Fournet's opinion clear-
ly indicated that the Supreme Court would continue to uphold
specific short forms for well understood crimes. Since
Straughan, specific short forms have been upheld for attempted
murder, 8 negligent homicide, 19 and murder. 2 In State v. James21
the Supreme Court again upheld a short-form murder indict-
ment. In James defense counsel, clutching at a technical last
straw, argued that the definition of murder had been changed
by the 1942 Criminal Code,22 so that murder no longer had the
"universal and common meaning" of "the unlawful killing of a
human being with malice aforethought." The Supreme Court
made short work of this hyper-technical contention; Justice
Hawthorne pointed out that "the definition of murder was not
changed in essence when the crime was defined in Article 30 of
the Criminal Code of 1942. '' 23 As a matter of fact, the murder
article was a codification, stripped of confusing common law fic-
tions and terminology, of the well-settled murder concept. Clause
(1) embraced homicides where there was a "specific intent to
kill or to inflict great bodily harm"; while clause (2) codified
the felony-murder doctrine.
15. State v. White, 172 La. 1045, 136 So. 47 (1931) (murder) ; State v. Pete,
206 La. 1078, 20 So.2d 368 (1944) (theft) ; State v. Chanet, 209 La. 410, 24 So.2d
670 (1946) (aggravated rape) ; State v. Nichols, 216 La. 622, 44 So.2d 318
(1950) (manslaughter).
16. Accord: A.L.I., CODE OF CRnt. PROC. § 154a (1930).
17. 239 La. 1036, 87 So.2d 523 (1956).
18. State v. Elias, 234 La. 1, 99 So.2d 1 (1958).
19. State v. Coleman, 236 La. 629, 108 So.2d 534 (1959).
20. State v. Eyer, 237 La. 45, 110 So.2d 521 (1959).
21. 241 La. 233, 128 So.2d 21 (1961).
22. LA. R.S. 14:30 (1950).
23. 128 So.2d at 22.
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Bill of Particulars - Conjunctive Charges
Many crimes, including those defined in the Criminal Code
and in miscellaneous criminal statutes, provide that the offense
may be committed in a number of different ways. Frequently
the prosecution is not sure in advance of trial as to just which
form or forms of the crime will be established by the evidence.
In this situation Article 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
authorizes "conjunctive" allegations, in the indictment, of the
acts, means, intents, or results, any of which will constitute the
crime under the code article or statute. Where an offense is
charged conjunctively, proof of either act, means, or intent will
support a conviction.24 In State v. Thomrs 25 the principle of con-
junctive allegations was applied, in conformity with prior well-
reasoned decisions of the Supreme Court,26 to the statements in
a bill of particulars. In Thomas the indictment charged aggra-
vated rape according to the specific form authorized by Article
235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under the aggravated
rape article of the Criminal Code 27 the crime may be committed
in three different ways. Clause (1) covers the situation where
force is employed to overcome the victim's resistance. Clause
(2) applies where the victim is prevented from resisting by
threats of great bodily harm. Clause (3) bases liability on the
fact that the victim is under the age of 12 years - in which case
the law resists for her. The defendant's motion for a bill of par-
ticulars sought information as to the "particular type of aggra-
vated rape" that the state proposed to establish - being princi-
pally directed toward securing a specification as to whether the
rape was committed by actual force or by threatened force. The
trial judge held that the state could properly answer that it was
proceeding under all subsections of the aggravated rape article,
and could not be required to elect between them in advance of
trial. The theory of the Supreme Court's decision upholding the
sufficiency of the conjunctive bill of particulars was nicely put
in an excerpt from State v. Jackson,28 which was quoted with
approval in Justice Viosca's opinion. "The statute itself pro-
24. State v. Bryan, 175 La. 422, 143 So. 362 (1932).
25. 240 La. 419, 123 So.2d 872 (1960).
26. State v. Prince, 216 La. 989, 45 So.2d 366 (1950), discussed 11 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 240 (1951) ; State v. Jackson, 227 La. 642, 80 So.2d 105 (1955),
discussed 16 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 335 (1956).
27. LA. R.S. 14:42 (1950).
28. Note 26 supra; State v. Jackson, 227 La. 642, 648, 80 So.2d 105, 107
(1955).-
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
vides that aggravated rape may be committed under 'any one or
more of the following circumstances.' This means that the cir-
cumstances may consist entirely of those set out in any one of
the subsections or may be a combination of those set out in any
two or in all three. '29 The district attorney's statement that it
"is not required to elect on which portion of the statute it intends
to proceed; the State elects to proceed on all parts of the stat-
ute," was held sufficient in Thomas; but that type of answer is
not recommended. A more satisfactory answer, which would
conform with the analogous provision of Article 222 for charges
in the indictment, was the one given by the district attorney in
State v. Prince where "the answer to the bill of particulars in-
formed the defendant that he was being prosecuted for attempt-
ed aggravated rape under subsections (1) and (2) of Article 42
of the Criminal Code."30 (Emphasis added.) In both Thomas
and Prince the offense was probably committed by means of
both force and threats of force; but while both are charged,
proof of either means would support a conviction. To charge the
means disjunctively (by "or") would leave the nature of the
charge uncertain and would probably be held insufficient.31
Extradition Proceedings - Review by Supreme Court
In Extradition Proceedings v. Palmer32 a defendant sought to
appeal from a judgment of the district court which, after an
extradition hearing, affirmed the propriety of the extradition
and ordered that the defendant be delivered to the authorities
of the demanding state. In denying its appellate jurisdiction
from the extradition hearing, the Supreme Court very properly
held that Article VII, Section 10, of the Louisiana Constitution
limited its appellate jurisdiction to cases in which the penalty is
or may be imposed "under the laws of this state." The extradi-
tion proceeding does not contemplate any penalty under Louisi-
ana law; but rather the defendant's return to another state
where he is to stand trial. Where the district court improperly
approves a defendant's extradition,33 his remedy is to invoke the
discretionary supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
29. 240 La. 419, 425, 123 So.2d 872, 875 (1960).
30. Note 26 aupra; State v. Prince, 216 La. 989, 991, 45 So.2d 366, 367
(1950).
31. Judicial disapproval of disjunctive or alternative charges is indicated in
City of Shreveport v. Bryson, 212 La. 534, 33 So.2d 60 (1947).
32. 240 La. 784, 125 So.2d 164 (1960).
33. LA. R.S. 15:167 (1950) states specific grounds for a defendant's discharge
at an extradition hearing.
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Defense of Present Insanity - Examination and Hearing
Mental incapacity to proceed exists when, as a result of in-
sanity or mental defect, a defendant presently lacks the capacity
"to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his
defense. 3 4 In a case where the court has substantial reason to
doubt the defendant's mental capacity to proceed it may ap-
point a sanity commission and order a mental examination of the
defendant.35 The scope and adequacy of the sanity commission's
examination was challenged in two 1961 aggravated rape cases.
In State v. Augustine," a sanity commission consisting of two
physicians, the coroner and a psychiatrist, had been appointed
on application of the defendant. Based on the sanity commis-
sion's report and testimony, the trial judge held that the defend-
ant was presently sane and capable of standing trial. At the
hearing, and subsequently on appeal, defense counsel sought to
discredit the report and testimony of the commission physicians
by urging that their examination had been cursory and inade-
quate. In rejecting this contention the Supreme Court pointed
out that each of the court-appointed physicians had examined the
defendant two times while he was in the parish jail, and that
those examinations had included substantial conversations with
the defendant and with the deputy in charge of his tier in the.
jail. In upholding the sufficiency of these examinations, Justice
Hawthorne reaffirmed Chief Justice Fournet's practical holding
in State v. Faciene37 that, "There is nothing in the statute re-
quiring that an accused be kept under constant observation for
any fixed period of time, and the legislature has not therein at-
tempted to dictate to these experts the manner and method to be
employed by them in conducting their examination, undoubtedly
feeling, as do we, that they are eminently better qualified to
know just exactly how to best carry out their duties in this re-
spect as the particular facts of each case may warrant." The
Supreme Court's reluctance to second-guess sanity commission
procedures is further shown by State v. Wilson"8 where the san-
ity commission had been composed of the coroner, a psychiatrist,.
and a local general practitioner. The psychiatrist, who had ex-
amined the defendant for about forty-five minutes in the parish
34. Id. 15:267.
35. Ibid.
36. 241 La. 761, 131 So.2d 56 (1961).
37. 233 La. 1028, 1048, 99 So.2d 333, 340 (1957).
38. 240 La. 1087, 127 So.2d 158, 165 (1961).
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jail, was convinced as to his present sanity and ability to assist
in his defense. The general practitioner had conducted an hour
and a half examination. The coroner had examined the defend-
ant three times - once by himself and along with the other two
commission members. Again the Supreme Court rejected the
defense contention that the sanity examination had been inade-
quate.
Both Augustine and Wilson reaffirmed well-settled proposi-
tions that the trial judge determines the issue of present insan-
ity;3 9 and that "the law presumes that every man is sane. And
to warrant the sustaining of a plea of present insanity, thereby
preventing trial of a criminal accused, it must appear by a pre-
ponderance of evidence that the accused is so mentally deficient
that he lacks capacity to understand the nature and object of the
proceedings against him and to assist in conducting his defense
in a rational manner. '40 The defendant had not met this burden
of proof in either case.
Mental Defect, Short of Insanity, To Preclude Specific Intent
In State v. James41 no plea of insanity at the time of the
crime had been filed. At the trial defense counsel sought to in-
troduce psychiatric testimony as to the defendant's amnesia at
the time of the crime - for the purpose of showing that he could
not have entertained the specific intent to kill which is essential
to murder under Clause (1) of Article 30 of the Criminal Code. 42
The evidence was held inadmissible, and the court cited State v.
Gunter43 for the proposition "that where insanity or mental de-
fect at the time of the commission of the crime is urged, evidence,
tending to prove or establish such insanity or mental defect is
not properly admitted in the absence of a special plea of insan-
ity. '44 Thus, where there has been no special plea of insanity,
evidence of insanity or mental defect is neither admissible as a
complete defense under the "right from wrong" test (Gunter),
nor for the purpose of negating a specific intent which is essen-
tial to the crime charged (James).
39. LA. R.S. 15:267 (1950).
40. In Wilson the court was quoting, 240 La. 1087, 1110, 127 So. 158, 166
(1961), from State v. Riviere, 225 La. 114, 119, 72 So.2d 316, 317 (1954).
Accord: State v. Eubanks, 240 La. 552, 578, 124 So.2d 543, 552 (1960).
41. 241 La. 233, 128 So.2d 21 (1961).
42. LA. R.S. 14:30(1) (1950).
43. 208 La. 694, 23 So.2d 305 (1945).
44. 128 So.2d at 24.
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A substantive criminal law problem, not squarely presented
in James, is whether a mental defect or disorder, short of insan-
ity under the "right from wrong" test, can be shown to reduce
the degree of a crime by negating an essential specific intent or
knowledge.45 In any event, if partial insanity or mental defect
short of insanity is to be urged as a defense, it must be specific-
ally pleaded at the arraignment. This is a sound rule as to all
insanity defenses, since it enables the trial judge to appoint a
sanity commission to examine the defendant in advance of the
trial.
Right to Counsel
The indigent defendant's right to counsel, as provided for in
Article 143 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, 46 is
conditioned upon his making an affidavit that he "is unable to
procure or employ counsel," and the right to counsel may be
waived by the defendant's failure to request it. 4T State v. Lind-
sey 4s emphasizes the importance of the indigent defendant's
right to court-appointed counsel, by holding that the right to
counsel may be urged, for the first time, immediately before the
case is called for trial. In Lindsey the defendant had pleaded not
guilty and stated that he would employ counsel. Just before the
case was called for trial the defendant moved for a continuance
and for court-appointed counsel, on the ground that he had been
unable to secure an attorney. To appoint counsel and grant a
continuance at this late date would, according to the trial judge
who denied the defendant's motion, "allow an accused to use this
as a device to delay the trial. ' 49 In deciding that the refusal to
appoint counsel constituted reversible error, the Supreme Court
held that the defendant's statement upon arraignment that he
would procure counsel did not constitute a waiver of his right to
counsel. The Supreme Court apparently felt that there was not
an adequate showing that the defendant had appreciated the
right of an indigent defendant to court-appointed counsel, for it
states that the defendant "did not intelligently and understand-
45. This facet of the problem will be discussed by a student note in the next
issue of this Review.
46. LA. R.S. 15:143 (1950).
47. State v. Hilaire, 216 La. 972, 45 So.2d 360 (1950). Of. In a capital case
where the defendant is incapable of conducting his own defense, it is the duty of
the court to appoint counsel, whether requested or not; and failure to do so may
constitute a denial of "due process." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
48. 241 La. 205, 128 So.2d 11 (1961).
49. Ibid.
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ingly waive his right to counsel." If at arraignment the defend-
ant fully understood his rights and assumed the responsibility
for procuring counsel, there might be some question as to his
right to demand court-appointed counsel just before the trial
started, as in Lindsey. In this regard, however, the only statu-
tory rule is Article 143 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which
provides for "immediate" assignment of counsel "whenever an
accused charged with a felony shall make affidavit that he is
unable to procure or employ counsel."
After appointment of counsel, the trial court should give
careful and favorable consideration to a motion for a reasonable
continuance. In this regard, Justice Hamiter reaffirms a very
sound statement from State v. Howard"0 that "to make the con-
stitutional right to assistance of counsel effective, counsel must
be accorded a reasonable time for preparation of the case - that
is, time to investigate the facts and the law applicable. However,
what constitutes a reasonable time depends on the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case, and there should be a showing that such
time was needed, requested, and denied." 51 Another well-recog-
nized implementation of the indigent defendant's right to as-
signed counsel is the rule that counsel appointed after the ar-
raignment must be given a reasonable time to withdraw any mo-
tions, pleas or waivers made by the defendant and to enter any
other motion or plea.52
The Voir Dire Examination
The purpose of the voir dire examination is not limited to a
determination of those prospective jurors who are subject to a
challenge for cause. It may also include pertinent inquiries
which will enable the defense and the state to exercise intelli-
gently their right of peremptory challenge. It was upon this lat-
ter ground that great latitude of questioning was recognized by
the Supreme Court in State v. Hills.5 3 In Hills, where a Negro
defendant was prosecuted for aggravated rape of a white wom-
an, defense counsel sought to question prospective jurors con-
cerning their sympathy with or membership in segregation or-
ganizations. It was not seriously contended that a prospective
juror would be subject to challenge for cause by reason of his
50. 238 La. 595, 603, 116 So.2d 43, 45 (1959).
51. 128 So.2d 11, 13.
52. State v. Lyons, 180 La. 158, 156 So. 207 (1934).
53. 241 La. 345, 129 So.2d 12 (1961).
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membership in or sympathy with a segregation organization, for
school segregation was not an issue in the aggravated rape pros-
ecution. The primary justification for the questioning was that
the answers would be considered by defense counsel in determin-
ing the best use to be made of the twelve peremptory challenges
allowed by law.54 Justice Hamlin's majority opinion at the orig-
inal hearing, which upheld the trial judge's refusal to permit the
questioning, suggested that the questions were "too general" and
served to confuse the issues in the case. On rehearing, one of
the principal grounds for reversal was the trial judge's refusal
to permit questions concerning the prospective juror's member-
ship in or sympathy with segregationist organizations. In this
regard, Chief Justice Fournet stressed the importance of the voir
dire examination as a means of enabling counsel to determine
attitudes which play an important part in the exercising of per-
emptory challenges. "The intelligent exercise of the right of re-
jection, by use of those twelve peremptory challenges," states the
Chief Justice, "is the meat of the privilege, and can be substan-
tially weakened by a restriction of questions - the answers to
which might be regarded as informative of a juror's attitude and
therefore of vital importance to his defense . . . . 'Parties have a
right to question jurors on their examination not only for the
purpose of showing grounds for a challenge for cause, but also,
within reasonable limits, to elicit such facts as will enable them
intelligently to exercise their right of peremptory challenge.'-55
The questions in Hills would appear to be of high relevancy and
to have a reasonable relation to a determination of the use of per-
emptory challenges. However, it is important that such question-
ing be kept "within reasonable limits." The door should not be
thrown open to a broadside of capricious questioning under the
guise of assisting counsel in the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges.
The importance of full interrogation of prospective jurors on
the voir dire examination is illustrated by State v. Newton.56 A
false answer on voir dire examination, as to a matter which
might serve as a disqualification or basis of a challenge for
cause, will enable defense counsel subsequently to raise the issue
after verdict by a motion for a new trial.57 However, a different
54. LA. R.S. 15:354 (1950).
55. 129 So.2d at 31, quoting, in part, from State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 234,
198 So. 910, 915 (1940).
56. 241 La. 261, 128 So.2d 651 (1961).
57. LA. R.S. 15:355 (1950).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
situation is presented where the juror has merely remained silent
concerning a ground for disqualification, or as to an opinion
which might serve as the basis for a challenge for cause or a
peremptory challenge. In Newton, defense counsel failed to
establish, by the alleged "barbershop conversations," that the
juror had falsified when he stated that he had not formed any
conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant in the
instant case. It was admitted, however, that the juror had made
statements showing a hostility toward aggravated rapists and a
belief that they should be given capital punishment, if convict-
ed.58 This attitude, if established by voir dire examination, might
well have served as a ground for a challenge for cause. As a
corollary of the state's right to challenge a juror in a capital case
who "has conscientious scruples against the infliction of capital
punishment,"- 9 the defense may challenge a juror who is opposed
to qualified verdicts of "guilty without capital punishment."
In Newton no questions concerning the prospective juror's atti-
tude toward qualified verdicts, or aggravated rapists as a class,
had been asked; and he was under no obligation to volunteer in-
formation as to attitudes which might subject him to a challenge
for cause or a peremptory challenge. It is only where there has
been a false answer on voir dire examination that the defendant
has a right to urge incompetency or prejudice of the juror as the
basis of a motion for a new trial.6 1
58. 128 So.2d at 654, where the court cites the juror's admitted statement that
if a defendant in an aggravated rape case "were proven guilty," he wouldn't hesi-
tate to cast the first vote as to his guilt "and if necessary if they needed some-
body he'd pull the switch."
59. LA. R.S. 15:352(2) (1950).
60. State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940).
61. LA. R.S. 15:355 (1950).
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